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Abstract
The first successful attempt to photograph Mars at close range was made by
the Mariner Mars 1964 spacecraft. To meet the requirements for this mission, the
temperature of the components had to be controlled within desired limits. This
report reviews the design and the techniques used to make this control possible.
As a verification of the design, a series of ten tests was conducted using a tem-
perature control model (TCM) of the spacecraft. These tests were followed by
testing of more flight-type models: first, a proof-test model which was not flown,
and, subsequently, each flight model. This, however, did not completely repre-
sent the real spacecraft in the flight environment, because of ground support
equipment and cabling attached to the spacecraft. Flight temperatures were ob-
served and found to compare favorably with test results. Discrepancies were also
observed and discussions are noted in the report.
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Mariner Mars 1964 Temperature Control Subsystem
I. Introduction
This report presents a reconstruction of the design,
objectives, compromises, and techniques used to develop
confidence in the temperature control subsystem of
Mariner Mars 1964. Also included are comparisons
of preflight experimental results, using solar-space simu-
lation, and thermal data secured during the seven-month
flight to Mars. Viewing the design in retrospect, im-
provements which may be of value in future design are
suggested.
II. Background Information
The role of temperature control for the Mariner Mars
spacecraft is no different, in general, from that of any
other space vehicle. The basic objective of temperature
control is to insure to the extent possible that every com-
ponent of the spacecraft will be maintained at some
desired temperature even though that temperature may
vary from time to time. To accomplish this objective, the
thermal design responsibility was divided into two levels.
The thermal characteristics of a typical assembly consist-
ing of a number of electrical, mechanical, or chemical
components was the responsibility of the designer of that
assembly. However, when a large number of these assem-
blies was integrated into a spacecraft design, the overall
thermal design was the responsibility of the temperature
control subsystem engineer.
The general requirements for a temperature control
subsystem were specified by the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory. Responsibilities are described on organization charts.
However, since the temperature limit for an electronic
assembly may differ from the limit of the components in
the assembly, the specific engineering objectives are
more difficult to define. In some cases an assembly may
be considered to have failed if the performance falls
below a selected signal-to-noise ratio. Also, acceptable
limits may be determined by storage rather than operat-
ing temperatures, temperatures at which an assembly
can be turned on successfully, or a temperature selected
for the purpose of extending the operating lifetime of an
assembly. Formal thermal specifications for equipment
type approval and flight acceptance test levels often do
not directly correspond to the actual objectives of the
temperature control design. Rather, these specifications
serve primarily as the means of insuring common design
standards for a large group of equipment.
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The objective of the temperature control effort was to
establish a conservative thermal design, not to perform
an advanced experiment in heat transfer.
The mission requirements for a Mars flyby were par-
ticularly significant from the standpoint of a continued
spacecraft operation for an unprecedented period of
eight to nine months. A study was made of the average
length of time before failure occurred, on other space-
craft systems approaching the complexity of the Mariner
Mars 1964. The results made clear that a significant ex-
tension of operating lifetime over these systems would
be required. The success of Mariner Mars 1964, although
made possible through the use of selected parts and re-
dundant equipment, ultimately depended on the flight
temperature history.
Historically, the thermal design of the Mariner Mars
1964 was an evolution. Early success with the Pioneer III
satellite (Fig. 1) gave a false confidence in the existing
analytical capabilities. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) was in advanced stages of the Ranger project
before the impact that the increasingly complex designs
had on the temperature control was fully appreciated.
A direct comparison between predicted and actual flight
temperatures was further delayed when Rangers 1 and 2
failed to achieve their escape trajectories. With Ranger III,
it became convincingly apparent that both analytic and
experimental techniques were marginal, if not inadequate.
A. Mariner Venus 1962
The first of the Mariner series of spacecraft was flown
to Venus in 1962. It was, in reality, a modification of the
Ranger lunar spacecraft, although in most areas this
modification was extensive. The temperature control de-
sign was a radical departure from that of the Ranger
because a design which would be relatively independent
of the heating effects of the sunlight was necessary
for a Venus mission. Such a design was accomplished
by protecting the major portion of the spacecraft
from solar flux with multilayers of thermal radiation
shields. The power dissipated in the electronic assem-
blies was used to compensate for the unavoidable heat
losses. Since the power collected from the solar panels
was relatively small, insulation was used on the shady
side of the spacecraft as well. This design, known as the
insulated sandwich, also utilized thermally actuated
louvers for the first time. The louvers automatically
adjusted the emittance of some of the radiating surfaces
of the spacecraft. This action compensated for a pro-
grammed switching of electrical power during the flight,
and for the performance uncertainties of the thermal
design.
Independence from the solar flux was not complete for
the Venus spacecraft and, near the planet, temperatures
became higher than were considered safe for proper
equipment performance. The specific cause for this was
not isolated, but two theories explain the probable causes:
(1) Heat was conducted to the main equipment com-
partment from the sunlit superstructure and sup-
port legs.
(2) Heat was radiated to the equipment compartment
from the solar panels (both reflected sunlight and
thermal radiation).
The control capability of the louver assemblies was
exceeded before the Venus encounter, and the tempera-
tures continued to rise until the spacecraft began to de-
part from the sun, when all communication was lost.
Aside from the main equipment compartment, the
Mariner Venus had assemblies which tracked both
Venus and earth. The greatest deviation from the pre-
dicted temperatures occurred with an earth sensor which
moved, during the mission, from the sunlight to the
shade of the spacecraft, and into the sunlight again.
Although shades partially shielded the sensor, the vari-
able solar input was much more significant than that
predicted in preflight analysis.
The Mariner Venus had design features which were
considered good, and the testing features were not com-
pletely inadequate. The performance of the sunshades,
louvers, and thermal shields was excellent. The preflight
tests were conducted on a temperature control model
(TCM) of the spacecraft that duplicated all structure
and surface finishes. Electronic circuits were replaced
with resistors to provide an early verification of the
design. A vacuum facility with liquid-nitrogen-cooled
walls, and large enough for conducting a series of full-
size thermal tests, was completed shortly before launch.
The effect of the solar input was calculated for these
tests, and was supplied to the sunlit surfaces of the TCM
with electrical resistance heaters.
B. Mariner Mars 1964
Many of the design features1 of the Mariner Mars 1964
design were actually refinements of the Mariner Venus de-
sign. However, the reconfiguration of the Mariner Mars
'Design features are discussed in greater detail later in this report.
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permitted the addition of several new thermal design
considerations:
(1) Relocation of the solar panels above the equip-
ment bays to reduce the effect of reflected solar
energy.
(2) Use of sunshades on appendage items to permit
testing in a poorly collimated simulated sunlight.
(3) Provision for no movement of equipment into and
out of the sunlight.
(4) Minimum of exposed structure and cabling having
a solar-dependent history.
(5) Increase in louvered area.
(6) Improved thermal shield design.
The detailed packaging of the electronics was similar
except in the power and radio bays where a more ther-
mally oriented design was used.
Some aspects of the Mars mission had a dominant
effect on the temperature control design. Approximately
(depending on the specific trajectory selected) a 62/£
reduction in the solar radiation occurred during the
flight to Mars. For design purposes, the maximum solar
flux near the earth was 134 W/ft2, and the minimum
near Mars was 51 W/ft2, a change which occurred slowly
over a period of seven to nine months. A temperature
variation of about 125 °F would result for solar-dependent
appendages.
The solar heating on the equipment housed within the
main enclosure was minimal. Temperature variations
were determined by changes in the power distribution
and the control range of the louver assemblies. In con-
trast, some items, such as the magnetometer sensor and the
ion chamber, depended partly on solar power and partly
on internal power for temperature control. A plot of the
flight temperature for the solar panels, the magnetometer,
and the average temperature of the main equipment
compartment illustrates the long-term temperature varia-
tions in Fig. 2.
In addition to the relatively steady temperatures expe-
rienced during the long flight to Mars, severe tempera-
ture transients were experienced at each end of the
controlled flight. Initial heating occurred at launch, fol-
lowed by more heating during the parking orbit and the
solar acquisition period. About a week after launch,
when the trajectory was sufficiently determined, a cor-
a
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Fig. 2. Typical Mariner IV temperatures
rection maneuver required the spacecraft to leave the
preferred solar orientation in order to point the correc-
tion motor in the required direction. Simultaneously, a
redistribution of the internal power and the generation
of a heating pulse by the motor firing occurred. It was
during this maneuver that the spacecraft temperatures
reached a maximum.
Near the completion of the trip to Mars, when the
temperatures were lower, an encounter sequence was
initiated. This again resulted in a redistribution of elec-
trical power which caused a temperature change. Later
in the encounter sequence, during a period when pic-
tures were relayed to the earth from a tape recorder, the
electrical power was removed from the other scientific
instruments and this resulted in the lowest temperatures
experienced. These short term transients are also illus-
trated in Fig. 2.
III. Design Philosophy
The design philosophy of the Mariner Mars tempera-
ture control was intended that it be conservative and
remain as close to proven techniques as possible. Because
the ultimate design for flight was to be based on a series
of experimental tests, considerations which would limit
the meaningfulness of these test results received particu-
lar attention.
Many of the larger errors in solar simulation testing
were avoided by keeping the exterior of the spacecraft as
free of protruding or exposed parts as possible. This was
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accomplished by utilizing spectrally insensitive thermal
coatings and sunshades or shields to compensate for
simulation considered less than perfect. A variation of
the test parameters, using a thermal equivalent of the
flight spacecraft, determined the performance margin of
the temperature control system. This thermal equivalent
of the spacecraft was called a temperature control model
(TCM), and represented an extension of a technique
developed for the Mariner Venus and Ranger projects.
Unlike these previous projects, the thermal character-
istics of each Mariner Mars flight spacecraft was veri-
fied before launch. This was desirable because the
design was more sensitive to variations in the electrical
efficiency of the electronic components than that of the
Ranger. The Mariner Venus design problems were simi-
lar to those of the Mariner Mars, but a tight develop-
ment schedule and lack of adequate facilities precluded
this verification.
With any subsystem, the capabilities of the spacecraft
can be inadvertently restricted so severely that the de-
sired mission is no longer meaningful. A conservative
approach for one system often appears as a constraint
for another. Hence, particularly in the early stages of
development, tradeoff decisions are important. The ther-
mal design should remain sufficiently conservative, yet
retain a flexibility to allow for unexpected developments.
From a temperature control standpoint, these develop-
ments may result from
(1) Changes in virtually any part of the spacecraft.
(2) A subsequent and more complete understanding
of the thermal problems and requirements.
Guidelines for negotiations between personnel of vari-
ous subsystems were rarely listed and compared on a
formal basis. However, each subsystem engineer became
generally aware of the prime considerations of other
subsystems. This was particularly true of the tempera-
ture control subsystem, being as intimately a part of the
design of all spacecraft assemblies as it is. One of these
guidelines has already been implied in the design-to-test
philosophy where alternatives which reduced errors of
a specific solar space simulation facility at JPL were
selected.
A more fundamental guideline was to group as much
equipment as possible into one semi-isothermal compart-
ment, which was made as independent from the solar
influence as possible. The solar independence was re-
quired for most of the equipment because the change in
solar intensity was too great. The grouping of the equip-
ment also accomplished a number of secondary objec-
tives. Most important, equipment having little or no
power dissipation, such as structure, tankage, cabling,
propulsion equipment, computer circuits, logic elements,
and assemblies in a power-off mode could survive with-
out electrical heaters to make up for the unavoidable
heat losses. This efficient use of dissipated heat energy
was necessary, considering the limitations of the power
subsystem. A side benefit was a more reliable control, in
that heaters were not required and temperatures would
be less sensitive to equipment failures and power
switching.
In an attempt to achieve an isothermal central com-
partment, the equipment was located to give as uniform
a power distribution as was practical. Compromise was
necessary in some areas to reduce cabling weight and to
provide a more reasonable grouping of components.
To compensate for these power conditions, the heat ex-
changed between assemblies was made as large as pos-
sible. This was accomplished primarily by radiation, thus
avoiding a dependence on reproducible conduction paths
between the equipment packages.
The thermal criteria for the packaging of the elec-
tronic components was to provide a good and repro-
ducible heat path from the components to the exterior
radiating surfaces. In locations where the power density
was exceptionally high, the components were mounted
directly to the radiating surfaces. This technique is
discussed in more detail in Section IV, Design Consid-
erations.
The sun sensors, the Canopus tracker, the trapped
radiation detector, the cosmic dust detector, and the
equipment on the planet tracking platform formed a
group of items partly in and partly out of the main
equipment compartment. Thermally these assemblies
were considered a part of the main compartment because
the conduction and radiant ties to it were dominant.
Another important guideline pertained more to the
temperature control hardware. Many of the surfaces on
which the temperature control must rely were sensitive
to contamination. In some cases a simple inspection
could not verify the condition of the surface. In the past,
these surfaces were painted or polished during the final
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prelaunch preparations. Such surfaces sensitive to con-
tamination were avoided as much as possible by restrict-
ing the thermal design to the use of such items as
(1) Washable paints.
(2) Bolt-on polished metal shields which could be
maintained and protected independently from the
normal spacecraft operations.
(3) Replaceable louver assemblies.
IV. Design Considerations
A. Structural and Mechanical Subsystems
This group of subsystems consists of the basic struc-
tural elements of the spacecraft, and actuators, latches,
dampers, etc., which permit the placement and support
of the spacecraft elements. To simplify the temperature
control design, most of the geometrically complex ele-
ments were housed within the main equipment com-
partment (Fig. 3) and painted black, if the surface did
not already have a high emittance. The specification of
black paint on the interior structural elements and tank-
age was for increasing the heat transfer rates between
the bays during maneuver periods. An example of a high-
emittance surface treatment other than paint was the
cabling tray shown in Fig. 4. The tray housed a ring har-
ness of interconnecting cables. It was not painted, to
avoid any possibility of producing carbon-filled paint
flakes which might accidentally short the electrical con-
nectors. Therefore, a conversion coating (anodize) was
used to obtain a high emittance.
The tubular structure supporting the high gain antenna
was made of highly polished aluminum to increase the
resistance to heat flow through the structure, hence
through the upper thermal shield. The polished alumi-
num produced a surface with a low thermal emittance
which reduced the radiant exchange to the electronics
from the structure, and forced the heat through a rela-
tively long conduction path. A fiber glass structure would
have been more desirable (in retrospect), from a thermal
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Fig. 3. Mariner IV, viewing bay 2
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Fig. 4. Ring harness tray
aspect, but the superstructure was designed and fabri-
cated before the design of the upper thermal shield was
detailed.
The thermal shield design was compromised in both
the Mariner Venus and Mars spacecrafts because of de-
layed detailing. On the Venus design there was a delay
in the definition of the thermal requirements because an
acceptable white surface was not available. The Mariner
Mars upper thermal shield was delayed primarily be-
cause of project emphasis. The resulting design had over
30 structural penetrations and performed no better than
the earlier Mariner Venus design. The performance of
both shields can be approximated by using a theoreti-
cally perfect shield with the equivalent of a black ab-
sorbing cavity of approximately one square foot.
The sides of the spacecraft were exposed to direct
solar illumination only during the parking orbit imme-
diately following launch, and during the trajectory cor-
rection maneuvers. Most of this area was shielded by
using polished aluminum metal shields which reduced the
solar absorptance as well as the emitted heat. However,
the mechanization of the louvers was such that solar
heating would open the louvers further, causing expo-
sure of more area on the sides of the spacecraft to the
sunlight. To reduce the absorption of the sunlight,
the surfaces under the louvers were painted white (thus
only slightly compromising the emittance). Even with
these precautions, the electrical power normally dissi-
pated through the louvered areas was effectively bucked
by the sunlight. Had the back of the equipment bays
not been able to transfer heat across the equipment en-
closure to the shaded side of the spacecraft, the heating
effect from the correction maneuver would have been
excessive in some bays.
The initial design called out a zinc oxide potassium
silicate white paint (Z-93) to be used under the louvered
areas but this was subsequently changed to PV-100, a
white paint with superior mechanical properties. While
the PV-100 was known to yellow upon ultraviolet expo-
sure, the total exposure time accumulated during the
maneuver periods was short enough to negate this
effect. To provide more design flexibility and a stan-
dardized approach, all equipment bays (including those
shielded by the polished aluminum) were painted white.
A standardized approach was selected for packaging
the myriad of electronic components. To avoid thermal
gradients, the heat was radiated to space as near the
source of power as possible. To achieve this, the elec-
tronic components were rigidly mounted in a relatively
massive subassembly chassis illustrated in Fig. 5. This
heavy mounting approach was possible because the
packaging, structural, and thermal requirements were
combined in such a way that much of the structural
loading and rigidity requirements were also carried by
the chassis.
B. Power Subsystem
The power subsystem consisted of four solar panels
and a battery with an assortment of power regula-
ting and processing electronics. Except for the solar
panels, the power subsystem was located in bays 1 and 8.
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Bay 1 contained numerous inverters and a battery
charger packaged in the manner previously described.
The power dissipated in the battery charger changed
significantly from 8 W to approximately 18 W between the
simulator tests of the proof test model (PTM or MC-1)
spacecraft and the first flight unit (MC-2). The thermal
implications of this change remained undetected by the
engineering change request (ECR) system used on
Mariner and the resulting high temperatures experienced
during the MC-2 tests came as a surprise.
The power dissipated in the power subsystem was
uncertain in both the Mariner Venus and Mars designs.
In the Venus spacecraft the booster regulators varied
considerably between serial numbers of an otherwise
identical design. The power dissipation of the Mariner
Mars booster regulators was very close to design esti-
mates (within 1.5 percent) but the inverters were not.
Bay 1, with the battery charger turned off, dissipated
18 W compared to an estimate of 13 W. Louvers were
used on both bays 1 and 8 to help compensate for these
uncertainties. A 20-W jump in power occurred when a
second booster was turned on during the midcourse
maneuver.
The booster regulators were located on the radiating
surface of bay 8 and were packaged in a nonstandard
way. Because of the high power density of the compo-
nents, particularly several power transistors, the com-
ponents were mounted directly to a modified shear web
used in bay 8. The resulting flat package also provided
adequate volume inboard from bay 8 for the battery
assembly.
The battery was one of the more thermally critical
items on the spacecraft. Initially, the allowable limits
were set at 50 to 120 °F but this range was later in-
creased to 40 to 140 °F. The battery temperature de-
pended on the average temperature of the equipment
compartment and its own uncertain power dissipation,
and was located inside the main equipment compart-
ment. Most of the time during cruise, the power dissi-
pated in the battery was near zero but would jump
approximately 20 W during discharging.
The temperature control objectives for the solar panel
arrays were simply to keep them as cold as possible for
the most efficient energy conversion. This was accom-
plished by raising the emissivity of the front by using a
cover glass over each cell, and of the back by painting
the structure black. The black paint on the back of the
panels resulted in a heating problem during the parking
orbit period but the more desirable white paint would
have caused a stray light problem for the Canopus
sensor on at least two panels. To make all panels inter-
changeable for economic reasons, the black surface was
selected.
With a high emittance back surface, the temperature
of the panel would drop abruptly when the spacecraft
passed through the shadow of the earth. The low-
temperature panel characteristics presented the power
system with an overvoltage when the spacecraft reen-
tered sunlight. To handle this peak loading, a number of
zener diodes were located on the panel support spars,
thus regulating the voltage. The thickness of the spars
was increased locally to provide an adequate area for
radiating the power dissipated by the diodes.
The solar panels were almost totally sun-dependent.
A maximum change in spacecraft load to the panels
changed the panel temperature by approximately 5°F.
The panels had lateral temperature gradients caused in
one direction by the support spars and in the other by
the presence of the spacecraft.
The effect of the solar panels on the temperature con-
trol of the spacecraft was significant. Several alternate
spacecraft configurations initially considered could have
reduced this influence but the design selected was con-
sidered best because of competing requirements of the
planetary experiments. An equivalent of approximately
100 W was transferred to the spacecraft when near
earth and 20 W when near Mars. A further reduction
of this influence would have been possible if louver
assemblies had not been used on bays which were
adjacent to the panels. Another approach would be to
limit the opening of the louvers in such a way that the
radiating surfaces of the equipment did not have a direct
view of the panels. But neither of these alternatives was
considered necessary.
C. Attitude Control Subsystem
The electronic assemblies of the attitude control sub-
system were located in bay 7 of the main equipment
compartment. The assemblies consisted of a gyro pack-
age, an autopilot, and a computer controller and se-
quencer (CC&S) which included the spacecraft master
timer. The orientation of the spacecraft was maintained
by activating an array of cold gas jets at the extremes
of the solar panels. The nitrogen gas was supplied by
means of welded gas lines from two spherical pressure
bottles located with the main equipment compartment.
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The orientation was determined in two ways. During the
cruise conditions, either the sun and Canopus sensors or
the gyro error signals could be selected to provide an
error signal. The inertial control was used during the
maneuver periods. The optical sensors were located on
the upper and lower ring structure of the main equip-
ment compartment.
The power dissipated by the sensor electronics group
varied considerably between the cruise and maneuver
conditions. An estimated 7 W during cruise modes was
never completely verified. A measured value of 10 W
included the power dissipated in the Sun sensors and
control jets. This uncertainty, however, was small com-
pared with a 70-minute maneuver peak of 53 W (mea-
sured). To accommodate this variation, louvers were
placed on this chassis.
In two areas, the thermal design preferences for the
attitude control electronics were compromised in favor
of other design considerations. The first area was in the
location of the equipment in a bay under a solar panel.
With the peak power occurring simultaneously with a
possible sun illumination, the equipment could only sur-
vive on a transient rather than a steady-state condition.
On the other hand, it was more desirable both from logic
mechanization and structural alignment considerations
to locate the gyro assembly perpendicular to the primary
reference plane of the spacecraft. Since the heating
effect of the solar panels (although initially underesti-
mated) was not excessive for the planned maneuver pe-
riods, the tradeoffs were made in favor of the simpler
configuration.
A second area of consideration was in the packaging
of the autopilot. Because of a large number of intercon-
necting cables required to package this assembly in
several of the standard 6X6-in. modules, a single non-
standard package was considered more reliable. The
interconnecting circuit-board approach selected was of
concern because of the high power dissipated during the
maneuver and the uncertainty in the heat path to the ra-
diator. As a result, the assembly experienced a larger
thermal gradient than would have been experienced in
the standard approach. However, the predicted tempera-
tures were within an acceptable range and the choice
was made in favor of the potentially more reliable inte-
grated assembly.
In flight, the gyro assembly was turned on an hour
before the initiation of the maneuver turns to assure that
no starting transients remained except the temperature.
Although the drift rate of the gyros was relatively insen-
sitive to their temperature, a prediction to within 10 "F
at the start of the pitch turn was necessary. During the
hour warm-up period, the temperature of the gyro as-
sembly would normally rise from 50 to 115 °F. The pre-
diction for the initial condition could be adjusted using
the gyro in-flight cruise temperature, but the transient
response had to be based on prelaunch information. No
special provisions were required to achieve these objec-
tives, primarily because of the relatively massive gyro
housing which provided an adequate and reproducible
heat capacitance.
A complicating factor with the temperature control of
the attitude control electronics was the relatively low
upper-temperature limit (122°F) considered safe for the
computer controller and sequencer (CC&S) assembly.
This limit was of particular concern since the failure of
the CC&S (just before the loss of communication) in the
Mariner Venus spacecraft was thought by some to be
thermally induced. From thermal considerations alone,
a location in a more stable portion of the spacecraft —
such as bay 4 — would have been more desirable but
would have nullified the obvious operational and cabling
advantages of having all of the attitude control elec-
tronics in a single case.
The temperature control of the attitude control gas
tanks benefited greatly from the philosophy of putting
everything possible in the main compartment. As with
the structure and propulsion equipment, black paint was
used.
The sun sensors (both primary and secondary) and an
earth sensor also benefited from the temperature con-
trolled main enclosure, but not in the same way. The
sensors were exposed to the exterior and conductively
coupled to the upper or lower ring structures. The
primary sun sensors would have been thermally solar
dependent (an untenable design) except for this strong
conduction tie. Initially, all of the exposed areas, except
for a small black area around the optical sensors, were
of polished metal to reduce the solar absorptance. This
was later modified to incorporate small partial hoods or
capes made of multilayered insulation to reduce the solar
heating still further.
Another part of the celestial sensor group of the atti-
tude control system and, clearly, the most difficult part
over which temperature control could be established
was the Canopus tracker. The tracker established the
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primary roll reference for the spacecraft by tracking
the star Canopus with a photomultiplier detector. Un-
fortunately, this detector limited the upper steady-state
temperature to 100°F, a condition which became critical
during the midcourse maneuver.
The spacecraft temperatures rose during the maneu-
vers because of an increase in internal power and a loss
of the sun orientation. The lower ring structure, under
certain conditions, reached an estimated temperature of
130°F. The initial approach was to mount the tracker
on insulated stand-offs (Fiberglas 91 LD) which would
develop at least a 30° temperature drop across the
mounting points. In addition, a white stripe on each side
of the tracker would serve to adjust the radiated heat
to the desired temperatures. Laboratory tests were con-
ducted to verify the performance of the mounting
technique and the joint resistance appeared to be
reproducible.
Later in the evaluation of the spacecraft design, it was
recognized that one of the possible maneuvers would
point the optical axis of the tracker near the sun. To pre-
vent damage to the detector, a shutter was designed
which would cover the viewing part of the tracker when
a sensor mounted on the face of the tracker detected the
sun.
At this point in the design, two other pieces of infor-
mation also became available. The thermal tests indi-
cated that the lower ring temperatures did not reach
130 °F during the maneuver as were expected, and that
the Canopus tracker could be exposed to temperatures
as high as 125 °F for short periods (not exceeding one
hour) without damage. With this additional information
and considering the vital nature of the Canopus refer-
ence to the mission a more conservative approach was
selected.
This revised design consisted of an unpainted, polished-
metal cover for the entire tracker assembly except for
the viewing port and a metal-to-metal attachment to the
lower ring structure. This, in effect, coupled the tem-
perature of the canopus tracker to the lower ring and in
turn to the control capability of the louvers on bay 8.
A heating condition which was nearly overlooked oc-
curred after the final prelaunch checkout when the
spacecraft was transported to an explosive-safe facility
for installation of the propulsion system and the pyro-
technics squibs. It was then sealed in the flight shroud
and transported to the launch pad. During the trip to the
explosive-safe area, the spacecraft was protected with a
black plastic (electrically conductive) cover supported
by a tubular structure. The combination of a warm
Florida day and direct sunlight on the black plastic pro-
duced an inside ambient temperature above the allow-
able limit for the photomultiplier tube. To reduce the
solar input and the temperature to an acceptable level, a
second bag of aluminized mylar, with the mylar side out,
was used over the black one.
The other potential thermal problem with the Canopus
tracker was a side effect of its sensitivity to the Van Allen
radiation environment near the earth. To prevent dam-
age to the detector, the tracker was not turned on until
the spacecraft was 10 or 12 hours away from the earth.
During this period of low internal power (1% W), the
temperature of the assembly would drop below its
lower limit (0°F) and experience turn-on difficulties. A
heater was included in the Canopus tracker which used
the back contacts of the relay that controlled the
power supplied to the tracker. Therefore, constant power
was supplied to the tracker assembly at all times whether
it was operating or not.
Located at the tip of each of the four solar panels was
the rest of the attitude control equipment. The attitude
control jets were capable of operating over a very wide
temperature range, but a high gas temperature made
more efficient use of the available gas supply. A plating
of the gas manifolds with rhodium also reduced the
change in temperature during turn maneuvers and
achieved a higher gas temperature in the manifolds.
Rhodium was selected because of its low emittance and
insensitivity to the spectral differences between the sun-
light and the mercury-xenon solar simulation used for
testing.
Attached to each of the gas manifolds was an engineer-
ing experiment called a solar vane. This was an electro-
thermo-mechanical device which moved a large surface
in such a way as to balance the solar pressure on the space-
craft. Each time a jet was fired, the position of the vanes
was adjusted accordingly. Within the limit cycle of the
control jets was a thermal attitude control limit cycle.
This position adjustment was accomplished by changing,
with two slotted shields, the shadow pattern cast on a
bimetallic strip (see Fig. 6). The change in the ratio of
shaded-to-sunlit area would cause a change in the tem-
perature of the bimetallic strip, hence a change in the
position of the solar vane. The bimetal was thermally
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Fig. 6. Solar vane actuator assembly
insulated with plastic supports and painted black on
the sunlit side. The other surfaces of the strip were gold-
plated. The black paint was used to raise the level of
the heat absorption to a point where conduction losses
were relatively small; and the gold plate was used to em-
phasize the temperature sensitivity of the black surface.
D. Telecommunications Subsystem
The prime consumer of the energy provided by the
power subsystem is the telecommunications subsystem.
It consists of two types of antennas, a data encoder, the
receiver-transmitter assemblies, and the command and
video storage units. Of these equipments, all but the an-
tennas and associated waveguides were packaged within
the main equipment compartment in bays 4, 5 and 6.
The data encoder and command assemblies were
packaged using the standard 6X6-in. modular tech-
nique. They shared bay 4 and together dissipated a mea-
sured 11 W (design estimates were 16 W) of power. No
special provisions were required nor any thermal prob-
lems experienced with these units. Located in the adja-
cent bay 5 were the radio receivers and the video storage
assemblies. They, too, were packaged in the standard
way except for the tape deck, which was larger than the
standard module and was internally shockmounted and
pressurized.
The small amount of power in bay 4 required that the
entire surface be shielded with polished aluminum to
prevent excessive heat losses. An American flag, sym-
bolic of the first nation to successfully encounter Venus,
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was included within the layers of the upper thermal
shield of the Mariner II. After considering the complexi-
ties of the upper and lower thermal shields of the
Mariner Mars it was considered potentially a risk to
include the flag in the same manner as that used on
Mariner II. The bay 4 shield was a convenient location
for the flag provided that the emissivity of the shield
surface was not significantly raised. Nonmetallic coat-
ings (such as red, white, and blue paint) were obviously
not acceptable from this standpoint and experiments with
thin conversion coatings for the aluminum either raised
the emissivity too much or resulted in colors which were
too pastel. Hence, other suitable symbols, which could
be chemically etched in the polished surface, were con-
sidered. A design consisting of the Great Seal encircled
by the words United States of America satisfied these
criteria and appeared on bay 4 of the first spacecraft to
encounter and photograph the planet Mars (Fig. 7).
The power dissipation in bay 5 was also lower than
was desired from a temperature control standpoint, with
but seven watts during most of the cruise and 3 or 4
additional watts during the operation of the tape re-
corder. This condition resulted from a joint desire for an
efficient grouping of the telecommunications equipment
to reduce the number and length of interconnecting
cables and a relatively tight temperature control require-
ment for the tape machine. This latter desire required a
set of louvers on the bay although the bay did not within
itself dissipate enough power to account for the unavoid-
able losses through a closed set of louvers (approximately
11 watts). To account for this situation, heat was trans-
ferred (by means of conduction and radiation) to bay 5
from the adjacent bay 6 where the high power and
warmer transmitting equipment was located. This re-
sulted in a more complex thermal control condition than
was initially intended but proved to be an acceptable
way of maintaining a more optimal tape machine
temperature.
An interesting diversion may be worthy of discussion
at this point. Two telecommunications assemblies, the
tape deck just mentioned and the radio power supplies
yet to be discussed, had a double standard for tempera-
ture limits. Although the flight acceptance (FA) upper-
temperature limit was 130°F, the engineers responsible
for the equipment required (for valid reasons) much
lower long-term temperatures. For example, the tape
deck was not actually to exceed 75 "F. In this as in other
examples the temperature limits published in the Space-
craft Design Specifications did not necessarily reflect the
design objectives for the temperature control subsystem.
In future spacecraft specifications, in addition to flight-
acceptance temperature limits, some indication of the
most desirable temperature range from reliability or
long-life considerations, or both, should be included.
The remaining bay, which contained telecommunica-
tion equipment was bay 6, which housed the transmitter
power amplifiers and associated power supplies. The
RF power amplifiers were high-heat-dissipating units
(25 to 35 W) that required additional attention but caused
no difficulty in the achievement of an acceptable design.
Two different power amplifier designs were used to
achieve the most reliable operation. In each unit the
high local-heat flux was distributed by means of a thick
aluminum base which was machined as part of the
power amplifiers. This distribution reduced the heat flux
per unit area at the bolted interface between the ampli-
fier and the face of the equipment case. In this way, the
thermal resistance across the joint was not critical and
required no intermediate conducting materials or shims.
The final selection of the power amplifier designs and
their associated power supplies was not made until very
late in the development schedule. Consequently, the
power estimates changed from 57 W to 42 W and then
to 62 W. In the final design there were two modes of
operation: one dissipated 42 W, the other 62 W. To ad-
just the temperature control design for the changes from
one fixed level to another, only a corresponding change
in the unshielded area on the bay was required. But to
compensate for the final condition where large power
variations occurred, the bay was outfitted with louvers.
Fortunately the louver assemblies were standard, and
the bays had the necessary attachment fittings already
installed. However, to bias the power radiated from the
bay, three louver blades covering the local area adjacent
to the power amplifiers were removed to expose more of
the white surfaces beneath.
The low-gain-antenna waveguide was located inboard
from the transmitter electronics. The waveguide con-
sisted of a thin aluminum tube 7 ft long and 4 in. in
diameter and was fed by a short length of coaxial cable
at the base. The aluminum interior was gold-plated to
increase the electrical conductivity and the exterior was
chemically polished to reduce the surface thermal emit-
tance. The low thermal emittance was used to reduce
the thermal distortion of the waveguide during maneu-
ver modes. One end of this long tube was attached to a
warm equipment compartment and the other end heated
by the sunlight.
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Fig. 7. Mariner IV, viewing lower thermal shield and bay 4
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A second antenna was used for communication when
the spacecraft exceeded the range of the low-gain an-
tenna. This high-gain antenna consisted of a section of
a parabolic reflector located above the upper thermal
shield. The dish was mounted to the superstructure of
the main equipment compartment and the feed of the
antenna was supported by a truss structure of glass-
reinforced plastic.
The dish structure was fabricated from thin-gage-
aluminum honeycomb. The core material was made from
0.7-mil-thick material and the face sheets varied from a
thickness of 4 mils near the edges to approximately 3 mils
near the center.
Potentially, two thermal problems existed with this
structure. The adhesive (FM-1044) used to bond the
honeycomb structure together was believed to lose most
of its strength at temperatures above approximately
220 °F. Analytical estimates predicted temperatures as
high as 240° to 250 °F as a result of a combined aerody-
namic and solar heating when the spacecraft was in the
parking orbit. During this phase the solar panels were
still folded. One way to lower the antenna temperature
was to paint the back of the solar panels white. This
approach would have been acceptable for the solar
panels, but the increased reflection of stray light would
have been unacceptable to the Canopus tracker. The
panels in the sunlight during the parking orbit were on
the opposite side of the spacecraft from the tracker but
this would have destroyed the advantage of having solar
panels which were interchangeable. Considering the
fragile structure of the panels and the high cost of pro-
viding flight spares, this approach was not attractive.
Tests were conducted which simultaneously subjected
the high-gain-antenna dish structure to the anticipated
temperatures and the Agena second-bum-vibration en-
vironment. There was no measurable damage to the
honeycomb structure although the margin was probably
small. Fortunately, the parking orbits associated with the
actual launch dates were not the ones in which the maxi-
mum heating would have been experienced and validity
of this decision was never subjected to the final proof.
The second area of concern with the high-gain-antenna
structure was one of thermal distortion. Normally such
a structure, if unrestrained, would contract evenly as the
temperatures dropped, resulting in negligible change in
the antenna field pattern. However, the honeycomb dish
was bonded to a heavier honeycomb collar which was
attached at discrete points to the superstructure. The
complex interaction between the parabolic dish and its
supporting structure was experimentally checked and
found to result in a slight "flowering" effect where the
tips of the shell separated as the narrower dimension
closed. This effect was minimized by leaving the back
side of the aluminum honeycomb shell unpainted, thus
restricting the radiant transfer of heat from the back of
the structure and minimizing the front-to-back tempera-
ture difference.
Another goal was to achieve the same temperature
level and distribution at Mars as existed during the map-
ping of the antenna pattern on the earth. This required
that the absorptance—emittance ratio of the antenna front
surface be approximately 0.88. A green chromate paint
was used instead of a mosaic pattern of black and white
because the lateral conduction in the honeycomb was
small. Although this paint visibly changed from a bright
green to a drab olive color after ultraviolet exposure, the
desired ratio appeared to be stable.
The high-gain-antenna feed also approached an upper
allowable temperature during the parking orbit. The
feed assembly consisted of an inverted gold-plated (for
RF conductivity) box with a circuit board attached to
the inside. The circuit board was made of a Rexolite
plastic and was mounted to the box with screws. At
temperatures above 180 °F the Rexolite lost much of its
strength and there was a visible flow of plastic from
under the screws. The feed assembly was able to survive
the heating effect during the parking orbit by the lower-
ing of the ambient temperature of the shroud which en-
closed the spacecraft during the launch phase, and the
using of the heat capacitance of the feed structure to
limit the temperature rise.
The cruise temperature of the high-gain-antenna feed
was adjusted by using white paint on the sunlit top and
the shaded end. During the solar vacuum testing the
feed temperature did not show the expected response to
variations in this paint pattern. Variations in the prop-
erty of the white paint or the spectrum of the solar
simulator was first suspected. Later the variation was
identified as an RF power dissipation in the feed assem-
bly. During normal operation, the feed appeared to dis-
sipate either one-half or two-thirds of a watt, depending
on which power amplifier was in operation. The feed
temperature had a 4° to 10 °F respective jump above
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that for the nonoperating condition. This increase com-
pared favorably with an independent estimate of the RF
losses in the antenna system.
A final area of concern with the high-gain feed was
the effect of focused sunlight on the feed during ma-
neuver periods. The feed would clearly overheat if all
of the solar energy intercepted by the dish were to be
focused on it. Two conditions were required for this to
occur. The first was that the antenna be pointed to the
sun and the second that the antenna dish reflect specu-
larly. Experiments with the front face painted both black
and white indicated conclusively that the specular com-
ponent of the reflected energy of the paints considered
was sufficiently small that overheating would not occur.
This may not be true for larger or unpainted dish
structures.
E. Space Science Subsystem
The primary scientific objective was to secure higher
resolution photographs of Mars than had previously
been possible. With a relatively modest additional effort,
many secondary objectives associated with the scientific
investigation of the near planet and interplanetary envi-
ronment could be achieved. An ultraviolet photometer
was initially one of the planetary instruments. The tele-
vision camera, the ultraviolet photometer, and the sen-
sors used for planet orientation were mounted on a
single-degree-of-freedom platform which rotated with
respect to the roll axis of the spacecraft. A radio occulta-
tion experiment which provided information about the
Martian atmosphere was possible with no on-board
equipment other than that already required for com-
munication with the earth. A group of particles and
fields experiments made up the balance of the scientific
measurements. Included in this group was a magnetom-
eter, an ion chamber, a trapped radiation experiment, a
cosmic dust detector, a solar plasma experiment, and
a cosmic ray telescope.
The thermal design of the planet platform varied con-
siderably during the design evaluation as a result of
change in the complement of instruments and an under-
standing of the heat transfer problems. Eventually, only
a vidicon camera was flown; but the preflight configura-
tion included an ultraviolet spectrophotometer and, al-
though not simultaneously, an infrared spectrometer.
The actuator for the planetary scan platform was a
pressurized unit dissipating no power except during the
actual scanning period. The actuator was located within
the main equipment compartment and experienced only
small temperature variations during the flight. Similar
conditions existed for the bearings and torque tube which
supported the planetary science on a cantilevered shaft.
These instruments were located in the shade of the
spacecraft both for viewing simplicity and for more reli-
able temperature control. The initial design considered
the science platform as an appendage item. The tem-
perature of the platform was maintained by a combina-
tion of heat dissipated within the instruments, and heat
conducted to the assemblies by means of their support-
ing structure. The extreme differences between the de-
sired operating temperatures of the vidicon camera and
the infrared detector, while mounted to the same support
structure, dictated a relatively unconservative design.
The vidicon was qualified to a 0°F lower temperature
limit and the infrared detector, which needed to be as
cold as possible, as low, it was hoped, as — 300 "F. It
was difficult to achieve these temperature differences
even by using well-insulated support mounts. In this
approach, it was necessary to further cool the infrared
detector with a cryostat. This approach was never actu-
ally tested because of the timely substitution of the ultra-
violet spectrophotometer.
The compatibility of the ultraviolet instrument with
the temperature range desired for the vidicon resulted
in a much simpler temperature control design. The ap-
proach was to reduce the total amount of heat losses
from the platform by polishing or plating all exposed
surfaces. At this point, theory and practice parted ways.
By the time the design was complete, the sum of all of
the small losses from such items as cracks, connectors,
screws, and the instrument apertures became significant.
Tests indicated that approximately 11 watts were being
radiated from what had been assumed to be low emit-
ting surfaces. While the main equipment compartment
could readily supply these watts, of more concern was
the way this heat was conducted to the platform. About
half the heat was conducted to the torque tube through
the lower sleeve bearing, with the balance being ab-
sorbed through infrared radiation from the surrounding
electronic equipment. The uncertainties associated with
the conduction through the bearing, and the uncon-
servative nature of the tests (which did not simulate
zero g conditions) indicated that a change in the design
approach was needed.
A change was made to consider the science platform
not as an appendage but as an extension of the main
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equipment compartment. This was possible because the
infrared spectrometer was now history and a turret type
shield which satisfied both the mechanical and scanning
requirements could be mechanized. This shield effec-
tively increased the heat transfer rates to the platform
and provided a dominant radiation heat exchange in
parallel with the existing uncertain conduction paths.
The exposed surfaces of the planet-oriented equipment
remained unchanged but those enclosed within the tur-
ret were painted black. Shortly before flight, difficulties
developed with the ultraviolet spectrometer and the in-
strument was replaced with ballast; but the substitution
was made in such a way that the temperature control
design remained unchanged.
The fields and particles experiments provided a variety
of temperature control problems. Where possible, com-
ponents with narrow allowable temperature range
were located within the main equipment compartment.
The electronics for the plasma experiment and the
magnetometer were located in equipment bay 3. This
permitted a more desirable location of the sensors with-
out severe thermal limitations or power demands. Other
instruments could not be conveniently separated from
their electronics, usually because of low-level sensor out-
puts. The trapped radiation experiment, the cosmic dust
detector, the cosmic ray telescope, and the ion chamber
were of this type. The ion chamber was completely out-
side the main equipment compartment. The other three
instruments were thermally tied to the main compart-
ment with only detectors or apertures exposed to the
exterior.
The magnetometer sensor (Fig. 8) was mounted on the
low-gain-antenna waveguide to separate it as far from
the magnetic disturbances of the spacecraft as possible. To
avoid disturbing the antenna field pattern, the magne-
tometer was not located higher on the waveguide. With-
in the sensor was a helium lamp which dissipated
approximately half a watt of power. This lamp deter-
mined the allowable temperatures for the sensor. A sig-
nificant increase in the operational lifetime of the lamp
could be expected if temperature were maintained below
70 °F, at least during the long cruise periods.
A shield was attached to the upper end of the magne-
tometer sensor to decouple it from the changing solar
input. To conserve the internally dissipated power, alu-
minum was vacuum-deposited over the plastic sphere;
and polished aluminum was used for all other surfaces.
The solar input and the uncertainty of partial shadowing
from the low-gain-antenna ground plane was also re-
duced by providing a thermal shield directly over the
sensor. This approach had two weaknesses which were
rationalized in the following way.
The first weakness was a heating effect which oc-
curred during the correction maneuver whenever the
sun shone on the polished sides of the sensor. The heat-
ing was not too severe, however, and the short times at
elevated temperatures were not considered too much
risk. The second shortcoming of the approach went to
the other extreme. During the playback mode when the
spacecraft was transmitting the pictures recorded during
encounter, all power was removed from the cruise instru-
ments. The removal of the power from the magnetometer
sensor, and the intentional decoupling from the solar
radiation, resulted in very low temperatures. Tempera-
tures near — 50 °F were expected and there was concern
that the sensor would not again turn on after the com-
pletion of the picture playback mode. During the actual
flight the sensor did restart after reaching a steady-state
temperature of — 66 °F. However, at that point the ob-
jectives of the mission would have been satisfied and a
more complex thermal design for the magnetometer was
not warranted.
The ion chamber, like the magnetometer, was also
mounted on the low-gain-antenna mast (Fig. 8). Unlike
the magnetometer, the ion chamber was a self-contained
instrument package with both sensors and electronics.
Because of the size of the sensors (an ionization chamber
and a Geiger-Mueller tube) and their location on the
spacecraft, the temperature history of the ion chamber
was predominantly influenced by the solar input rather
than its 0.4 W of internal power.
The shadow cast on the ion chamber by the ornni-
antenna ground plane was uncertain by as much as
0.8 in. This was due both to the distance separating the
ground plane from the instrument and to the limit cycle
of the sun-orientation control of the spacecraft. Like the
magnetometer, the ion chamber electronics was shaded
from the sun to emphasize the internal power. However,
to avoid restricting their field of view, shields were not
used over the detectors. The wall thickness of the ion
chamber sphere and the shield for the Geiger-Mueller
(G-M) tube was critically important for the interpreta-
tion of the scientific data. Therefore, paint could not be
used on most of these detectors. A small band of white
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Fig. 8. Mariner IV, viewing instruments on the
low gain antenna
paint was allowed near the end of the shield of the G-M
tube in a nonsensitive area, but a chromate pickling pro-
cess was necessary to obtain an acceptable coating (black)
on the ion sphere. To avoid overheating the G-M tube,
the shield was conductively coupled to the electronics
chassis. To assure good conduction heat transfer across
the bolted interface, a gasket of soft indium foil was used.
F. Temperature Control Subsystem
The hardware required to implement the thermal de-
sign of the spacecraft consisted of assemblies of louvers,
thermal blankets, sun shades, special surface finishes,
and an engineering flight experiment called an Absorp-
tivity Standard. A detailed discussion of the design of
this equipment is the subject of two other technical
reports2 and will not be repeated here.
2The flight experiment is described in TR 32-955 and the balance
of the equipment is discussed in TR 32-734. See Bibliography.
V. Verification Testing of the Thermal Design
A. General
The design approach and considerations discussed in
the previous sections represent a philosophy which was
ultimately based on test results rather than simpler de-
signs or analyses. From the beginning of the design pro-
cess, it was recognized that design was not generally
within the scope of analysis because of the many inter-
acting elements and their complex interfaces. During the
design phase, available data covering such items as
power, the shape and attachments of assemblies, and
even surface properties continued to change.
Thermal tests were conducted on a thermal test model,
a flight proof model, and each flight spacecraft. Conclu-
sions derived from these tests are summarized in the
following sections. Test summaries are listed and shown
in tabular form.
To consider this experimental approach, it was neces-
sary to compare the difference between the chamber and
space. The space chamber had cold walls to simulate the
heat sink that would normally be experienced in space.
The simulated solar source was not spectrally the same
as actual sunlight. Furthermore, the spatial distribution
of energy was not as uniform, nor as collimated, as sun-
light. The solar simulator had a divergence of the light
rays because of the optics of the order of two to three
degrees, or ten times that of actual sunlight. Fortunately,
it was not too difficult to design around these differences
and a decision was made to attain flight status through
verification testing.
B. Testing of the Thermal Control Model
In the initial solar simulator testing, a thermal equiva-
lent of the spacecraft was used rather than flight equip-
ment. The thermal control model (TCM) was basically a
full-size spacecraft (Fig. 9), identical to the flight model
except that electrical heaters replaced the electronics.
Other differences between the test conditions and the
flight conditions were found in the support bracketry,
electrically heated solar panels, and power instrumenta-
tion cabling. The use of heaters instead of electronics on
the TCM permitted a verification of the thermal config-
uration sooner than would otherwise have been possible,
and allowed design changes to be made earlier and more
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Fig. 9. TCM sun-oriented test attitude
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easily. In addition, the risk of damaging the flight space-
craft was greatly reduced. During the test, electrical
power (which was equivalent to that dissipated by the
electronics) was supplied to the TCM and the resulting
temperatures recorded. To achieve the desired tempera-
tures, changes were made to the spacecraft as required.
A series of ten separate tests was made for the TCM.
The tests comprised 35 test modes, and were conducted
in the JPL 25-ft solar simulator. At the conclusion of
these tests, the temperature control design was complete
for all assemblies and all anticipated flight conditions.
Several design differences between the TCM and the
first flight model — the proof test model (PTM) — be-
came apparent even before the conclusion of the TCM
testing series. Some of the early power measurements
made on the PTM during initial systems testing were
different from those estimated earlier. This, however,
was not considered unusual for a new design.
During the TCM tests, a problem recognized early in
the design as a limiting factor in the analytical assump-
tions also presented significant experimental difficulties.
The uncertainties in the performance of the thermal
shielding, particularly the multilayered blankets, domi-
nated the design. In the following paragraphs, this prob-
lem will be discussed as well as the method used to
predict the transient temperature extremes experienced
during the trajectory correction maneuver.
1. Thermal shield problems. Initially, all of the
Mariner 1964 thermal shields were of the multilayer
type, which used the technique of insulating with suc-
cessive radiation shields. The shields were made of alu-
minized plastic film that provided poor contact with
each other, but were vented to reduce "ballooning" dur-
ing ascent. The anticipated bus-average temperatures
were 87 "F at the earth, and 55 °F at Mars, but actual
results of the first TCM test showed only 61 "F at the
earth and 14 "F at Mars. To reduce the heat losses,
hence increase the temperatures, the shielded area was
increased before the second test. The final results of the
second test were 67 °F at the earth, and 31 °F at Mars,
showing only a small improvement over test 1. The
added peripheral shields were largely responsible for
the increase in temperatures.
For the third test, the entire nonlouvered periphery of
the bus was covered with small multilayered shields and
faced with aluminum foil. This arrangement provided a
lower emissivity outer surface to the shields. Test 3 tem-
peratures were high enough to verify that the power vari-
ations were within the control capability of the louvers.
Tests 4 and 5, a departure from the planned approach
for finding an adequate temperature control design,
were primarily an attempt to understand the thermal
shield problem.
Pursuing a theory that the heat was being lost from
the lower shield, an aluminum foil outer layer was added
to determine the effects of outside surface emissivity on
the lower thermal shield performance.
The temperatures were slightly higher than those in
test 3, but the differences were only slight. The follow-
ing conclusions were drawn from these tests:
(1) Although the theoretical performance of multi-
layered blankets is impressive, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve when the shield is small. It
appeared that there is little performance differ-
ence between a multilayered shield with a high
outside emittance and a polished aluminum sheet
metal shield at bus temperature.
(2) For the side shields, polished aluminum was more
convenient and the attachment problems were
simpler. The metal shields were not thermally
decoupled from the bus.
(3) Multilayered blankets were used for the upper and
lower shields because their physical support
and dynamic characteristics were simpler. They
proved to be lighter than an equivalent metal
shield; however, their performance was probably
no better.
(4) In addition, the upper shield was a multilayered
blanket to achieve a low solar absorptance as well
as a low emittance. The outer surface remained
black to reduce reflected lighting of the spacecraft
sensors, but it would probably have had a better
thermal performance if it had been white. The
white would have reflected more of the sunlight
and reduced the temperature gradient across the
blanket.
2. Midcourse maneuver tests. Approximately one week
after launch, and after sufficient tracking information
had been accumulated, the spacecraft was commanded
into a trajectory correction maneuver. A small fixed
motor was pointed in an appropriate direction by a pitch
and roll maneuver. The pitch and roll turns could have
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been small, thus leaving the spacecraft sun-oriented; but
such a maneuver was unlikely.
Several testing techniques were considered which re-
quired moving the spacecraft by remote control during
the solar simulator tests. However, they were discarded
in favor of a series of tests in various fixed orientations.
The tests to determine the solar heat input were con-
ducted using the TCM in the solar simulator. These re-
sults were combined with data secured from an actual
motor firing on a second spacecraft model as part of a
simulated midcourse (dynamic) interaction test (SMIT).
During TCM test 6, the transient temperature history
of a sun-oriented maneuver sequence (with no motor
firing) was observed. The temperature transients re-
sulted only from the switching of spacecraft power
(i.e., science off, gyros on, etc.). It was found that the
same premaneuver cruise temperature distribution could
be obtained with the arc lamps turned off, by supplying
additional power to the heaters simulating electronics.
A comparison of the solar heating with the electrical
heating is shown in Table 1. This technique was used
later in tests 7 and 8 when the spacecraft was mounted
in the solar simulator in the non-cruise orientation.
With the use of the information obtained in test 6, the
spacecraft was suspended in the solar simulator in two
"worst case" attitudes for tests 7 and 8.3 The gyro bay
was sunlit in test 7 (Fig. 10) and the bottom of the
spacecraft was sunlit in test 8 (Fig. 11). Cruise tempera-
tures, comparable with those of the test 6 results, were
established by applying power, as appropriate, to the
electrical heaters in the pitched orientation.
The lights of the simulator were turned on and
controlled with an iris, or shutter mechanism. At a time
corresponding to the beginning of the pitch turn, the iris
of the solar simulator was opened and the internal power
dissipation in the heaters was reduced, i.e., the power
representing sun load was changed from electrical to
solar. At the estimated time of sun reaoquisition, the
simulator iris was again closed and the power to
the heaters was again increased to represent the sun-
oriented heat load. The balance of the reacquisition se-
quence (Canopus acquisition) was completed and the
test was terminated.
"It must be remembered that the light-weight condition of the
TCM and the high absorptivity of white paints in the simulator
resulted in faster response than could be expected in flight.
Table 1. Temperature matching for maneuver sequence using electrical heaters
rather than simulated sunlight
Location
Bay 1 (power)
Bay 2b (motor)
Bay 3 (science)
Bay 4 (data encoder)
Bay 5 (tape recorder)
Bay 6 (radio)
Bay 7 (attitude control)
Bay 8 (power)
Time, mtn
0
(Start
ayroi)
30 60
(Start
pitch)
90 130
(Reacquire
sun)
150 180 205
(Reacquire
Caneput)
Temperature, °F
76/76'
74/59
76/76
77/77
90/90
95/96
71/70
73/76
81/81
75/59
76/76
78/78
90/90
96/97
80/79
76/79
82/82
76/60
76/76
78/78
91/91
97/98
84/83
79/82
80/76
77/67
77/72
78/76
91/89
98/96
90/88
81/81
80/78
78/70
77/73
79/75
92/89
100/97
92/89
83/82
80/81
78/67
78/77
79/76
93/91
101/99
92/89
82/87
80/82
79/66
79/78
80/77
94/92
101/101
93/89
82/85
81/81
79/65
78/79
80/78
94/93
102/102
93/90
83/85
"Temperature, using simulated sunlight/temperature with electrical heaters (i.e., T>nn/Theptir).
''No heaters were located in bay 2.
JPl TECHN/OU REPORT 32-957 21
Fig. 10. TCM pitched 90-deg test attitude
Tables 2 and 3 show average bay temperatures for
tests 7 and 8, for the 90-deg and 180-deg pitch maneu-
vers, respectively.
The effects of motor-firing were obtained from a
special test made during the simulated midcourse inter-
action tests (SMIT) conducted in a large vacuum cham-
ber at the Langley Research Center in November 1963.
During this test, a mass-mocked-up model was fitted
with a live propulsion system. The spacecraft was then
suspended in a 60-ft-diameter spherical chamber which
was evacuated to slightly less than 1 mm Hg. pressure.
The motor was fired for a maximum burn (90 seconds)
and the spacecraft was allowed to sit undisturbed until
heat from the motor had "soaked" back into the rest of
the spacecraft. The temperature rises measured at vari-
ous locations were used as predictions for the increments
in temperature due to a motor firing.
It was known that joint conductance and heat leaving
the spacecraft would be influenced by the residual atmo-
sphere, but calculations showed that the mean tempera-
ture rise would be approximately the same as in space.
The results showed that the electronics located nearest
the motor would experience a temperature rise up to
15°F (one hour after firing), but all other electronic
temperature rises (including gyros) would be negligible.
The total midcourse maneuver (MCM) temperature
rise was then assumed to be, in the worst case, the sum
of AT's due to various sources. Since the MCM is per-
formed near the earth, a midrange adjustment of the
near-earth cruise-mode temperatures was required so
Fig. 11. TCM pitched 180-deg test attitude
that all electronics could withstand the maximum ex-
pected temperature rise.
C. Testing of the Flight Models
Following the TCM tests, each flight-type spacecraft
was also tested in the solar simulator. The first of the
flight-type models was the PTM, which was subjected
to more extensive testing than the actual flight units.
Since these spacecrafts required a considerable amount
of auxiliary equipment to power and command them
into the various flight modes, more cabling to the test
item was required than during the TCM tests.
The test sequence in the solar simulator was divided
into two parts. The first part consisted of a systems test
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Table 2. Bay average temperatures, 90-deg pitch maneuver (bay 7 to sun)
Location
Bay 1 (power)
Bay 2 (motor)
Bay 3 (science)
Bay 4 (data encoder)
Bay 5 (tape recorder)
Bay 6 (radio)
Bay 7 (attitude control)
Bay 8 (power)
Time, min
0
(Start
gyres)
30 60
(Start pitch,
lights on)
90 130
(Reacquire
sun,
lights off)
150 180 210
(Reacquire
Canopus)
Temperature, °F
76
60
75
75
90
98
71
76
81
60
75
75
89
97
80
80
82
61
75
75
89
99
85
83
79
61
70
72
88
112
115
112
82
61
68
70
91
123
135
130
88
61
71
73
93
119
124
115
89
63
76
77
96
115
113
104
88
64
79
79
97
112
106
83
Table 3. Bay average temperatures, 180-deg pitch maneuver
Location
Bay 1 (power)
Bay 2 (motor)
Bay 3 (science)
Bay 4 (data encoder)
Bay 5 (tape recorder)
Bay 6 (radio)
Bay 7 (attitude control)
Bay 8 (power)
Time, min
0
(Start
gyros)
30 60
(Start
maneuvers,
lights on)
90 120 150 180 210'
(Reacquire
sun,
lights off)
240
Temperature, °F
78
60
76
79
92
99
73
76
82
60
76
79
91
100
81
80
84
62
76
79
91
100
85
84
80
64
72
77
92
97
93
88
83
67
72
77
92
98
98
91
85
70
73
78
94
100
100
93
87
71
74
79
96
102
103
95
90
76
77
80
99
106
105
100
88
74
80
83
100
109
98
95
"A conservative error in sequence resulted when lights were left on too long. Normal sun reacquisition occurs at Time, 130 min.
(Fig. 12) which developed confidence that the spacecraft
would operate satisfactorily in a vacuum by remote con-
trol. The number of access cables and stimulation hoods
for the sensors during this test was not limited, to permit
the maximum of visibility into the spacecraft's circuits.
The second part of the tests was more thermally oriented
(Table 4) and the access cables to the spacecraft (Fig. 13)
were severely restricted to make the tests more valid.
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Fig. 12. PTM systems test configuration
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Fig. 13. PTM thermal test configuration
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Table 4. Comparison of typical test temperatures of the Mariner 1964 flight models
Location
Equipment compartment
Bay 1 (battery charger)*
Bay 2 (motor)
Bay 3 (science)
Bay 4 (data automation)
Bay 5 (tape recorder)
Bay 6 (radio transmitter)1'
Bay 7 (gyros)c
Bay 8 (battery)
Magnetometer
Ion chamber
TV optics
Earth cruise temperature, °F
MC-1
(PTM)
72
76
70
78
69
100
75
87
46
94
55
MC-2
82
82
71
78
68
73
65
77
48
98
46
MC-3
(Mariner / V)
89
85
74
80
69
75
68
85
54
100
49
MC-4
88
82
71
79
72
86
69
83
50
113
43
Mars cruise temperature, °F
MC-1
(PTM)
63
51
58
61
60
80
61
74
-31
3
38
MC-2
57
49
58
61
58
62
57
66
-21
6
26
MC-3
(Mariner IV)
62
46
55
57
60
64
57
64
-19
10
26
MC-4
56
43
54
58
61
69
56
62
-25
10
20
"Power off.
''Radio in cavity amplifier mode.
rGyros off.
VI. Mariner IV Flight Data
A. Introduction
Mariner IV flight data showed that the monitored
temperatures remained within allowable limits through-
out flight. These temperatures were generally lower than
prelaunch predictions, but other thermal performance
was essentially as expected. The Absorptivity Standard
provided good information regarding the degradation of
thermal control surfaces in space and a better apprecia-
tion of the limitations of space simulator testing.
B. Flight Results Summary
1. Cruise temperatures. As shown in Table 5, the
initial cruise temperatures were considerably lower than
those predictions based on space simulator testing. The
items most sensitive to the solar input had the largest
discrepancies. The ion chamber and associated elec-
tronics were cooler than predicted by 30 "F; the magne-
tometer sensor by 20 °F; and the solar panels by 15 °F.
Postlaunch checks in the JPL 25-ft solar simulator
indicated that the spacecraft was probably tested at a
solar intensity that was 11% too high at earth intensity,
and 17% too high at Mars intensity. The Absorptivity
Standard black and gray samples agreed with these find-
ings as did the solar panel temperatures. The problem
appeared to have been caused by improper calibration
or interpretation of the reference thermopile.
This discrepancy did not provide the whole answer to
incorrect flight temperature prediction, because differ-
ent components indicated different amounts of intensity
mismatch. For example, the solar panels, bus, and ion
chamber results required 10%, 20%, and 30% reduc-
tions, respectively, to explain the flight results. After
compensation was made for the solar intensity, however,
flight temperatures were within the expected prediction
accuracy. The remaining errors are associated with the
failure to allow for inherent space simulator limitations
such as decollimation of the solar beam and extraneous
inputs of thermal radiation. The Manner flight data have
resulted in an improved understanding of these sources
of error and a stronger desire to avoid them in future
designs.
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Table 5. Mariner IV flight and test temperatures
Location
Equipment compartment
Bay 1 (battery charger)
Bay 2 (motor)
Bay 3 (science)
Bay 4 (data automation)
Bay 5 (tape recorder)
Bay 6 (radio transmitter)
Bay 7 (gyros)
Bay 8 (battery)
Bus average
Magnetometer
Ion chamber
Solar panels
Earth cruise, °F
Test
89
85
74
80
69
75
68
85
80
54
100
150
Flight
76
71
70
72
66
71
63
75
71
34
70
136
Difference
13
14
4
8
3
4
5
10
9
20
30
14
Mart cruise, °F
Test
62
46
55
57
60
73
57
64
52
-19
10
20
Flight
60
41
51
55
60
70
58
61
49
-35
-19
11
Difference
2
5
4
2
0
3
1
3
3
16
29
9
2. Departures from postlaunch predictions.
Temperature-time predictions, based on initial flight
data and simulator test results, are generally good sub-
ject to the following considerations.
A flight anomaly was that induced by incorrect solar
panel temperatures during simulator tests. The dummy
panels were forced to 150°F at the earth, and 0°F at
Mars. Corresponding flight temperatures were 135° and
10°F. On the basis of these tests, the earth to Mars tem-
perature drop was overestimated for bays adjacent to the
solar panels (odd-numbered bays). The resultant error
was small and conservative, but the requirement for
careful test interpretation was clear.
The magnetometer temperature gradually departed
from the predictions. By the beginning of the encounter
phase, the magnetometer was 6°F below the anticipated
temperature. This instrument had significant heat inputs
from both the sun and internal power dissipation, and
a deficiency in either input could cause such a drop. The
playback mode turn-off of the magnetometer produced
a smaller temperature drop than was experienced during
simulator tests, indicating that the discrepancy was
caused by a below-normal power dissipation in the unit.
The lower thermal shield temperature was somewhat
lower than that observed during simulator tests, and the
temperature drop during flight was slightly less than
expected. These data indicated that a small heat input
(about 2% of a solar constant) to the bottom of the bus
took place during the simulator tests.
3. Launch and maneuver transients. Launch tempera-
tures were sufficiently low to prevent overheating during
ascent, parking orbit, and sun acquisition. The launch
azimuth resulted in a moderate thermal environment.
The spacecraft separation occurred in the shadow of the
earth, and the sun-acquisition time was relatively short.
At sun acquisition, the temperature of the Canopus
tracker (100°F upper limit) was 74°. A shroud-off veri-
fication was obtained during the parking orbit by ob-
serving the temperature of two solar panels.
No constraint was placed on the midcourse maneuver
for thermal reasons. The 40-deg negative pitch selected
did not cause extreme solar inputs. A mild heating tran-
sient was caused by the increased solar heating, increased
power dissipation, and motor bum. All temperatures re-
mained within acceptable limits. The magnetometer
sensor heated more rapidly than was expected, the dis-
crepancy stemming from an oversimplified transient
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thermal analysis. Many of the maneuver events were
verified by observation of changes in spacecraft tem-
perature distribution. A qualitative confirmation by
temperature measurements was obtained for changes in
power distribution, extent and direction of pitch and roll
turns, and motor firing.
4. Thermal effects of internal power changes. Gyro
tum-ons during the early days of flight caused some
variation in bus temperatures, particularly in bay 7
where long-term gyro operation caused a rise in tem-
perature of 10 °F.
Fifteen days after launch, the power amplifiers were
switched in the radio transmitter in bay 6. The resulting
increase in power dissipation was 9°F in the tempera-
ture of bay 6 and a general increase of 1°F in the bus
temperature. These changes were almost the same as
those experienced in preflight space-simulator tests.
The removal of the cover over the science instruments
and the battery charger turn-off, on day 75 of the flight,
combined to lower bus and scan platform temperatures.
Bay 1 dropped 5°F and cooled adjacent bays slightly.
The scan platform temperature dropped 8°F because
of the increase in unblocked radiation area and de-
creased heat input from the bus. Since the Mars cruise-
temperature predictions were based implicitly on a
charger-off condition, the bus temperatures after the
turn-off were nearer the nominal values.
The slight rise in TV temperature at the beginning
of the scan sequence, coupled with the temperature drop
after TV turn-off, provided confirmation of normal TV
power dissipation and science cover drop. These data
were in good agreement with corresponding space simu-
lator results.
5. Encounter and playback results. Encounter warm-
ing transients were similar to those experienced during
the cover drop exercise. The battery charger turn-off
earlier in flight resulted in a more pronounced tempera-
ture rise at encounter than occurred during correspond-
ing simulator tests (i.e., the net power increase was
greater in flight than in tests).
Bus temperatures (particularly bay 3) showed a siz-
able temperature drop during the playback sequence
because of the turn-off of the cruise experiments. This
drop averaged about 1°F more than was experienced in
preflight tests, probably because the louvers were more
nearly closed (and therefore less effective) in flight. The
magnetometer temperature drop was 12 °F less than that
expected, which indicated that the power dissipation in
this sensor was less than had been assumed. However,
an off-scale drop of the ion chamber temperature trans-
ducer during playback prevented an estimation of the
power consumption of this unit. Such an estimate would
have been very helpful in failure mode analysis.
6. Absorptivity Standard flight results. The Absorptiv-
ity Standard provided good information regarding the
degradation of surfaces in space and the problems aris-
ing from the testing in the JPL space simulator. The
determination of the solar absorptance («s) in space was
not as accurate as desired because the radiation and
conduction losses were so large.
One of the first results noticed was that the white
paint ARF-24 was degrading at a rate much greater than
was expected from laboratory tests. This change has
continued at a pace about ten times as rapid as that
measured during the development of this coating. The
ratio of «s at any given step to the «s at the initial step
is plotted in Fig. 14. Subsequent ultraviolet exposure
tests on ARF-2 samples prepared at the same time as the
flight surfaces show a similar rapid degradation, raising
the question of the validity of predicting a paint's per-
formance without additional tests of samples prepared
'ARF-2 consists of ZnO and K3SiOj in water. It is the same as that
which has become known as Z-93, a coating developed at the IIT
Research Institute, Chicago, under contract NAS 7-100.
H
O
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100 1000
TIME, equivalent earth sun hours
10,000
Fig. 14. Degradation of solar absorptance of ARF-2
coating vs integrated exposure time normalized
to first observed data
28 JPL TECHNICAL REPORT 32-957
and applied by the user. The aluminum silicone paint
showed degradation but because of a sensor calibration
shift the degree was uncertain.
The polished aluminum sample showed an early deg-
radation greater than that due to the ARF-2 stripe
alone. After the first two steps, the data paralleled the
degradation that was due to the stripe alone. This indi-
cates that perhaps the metallic surface was vacuum-
cleaned early in the flight and then did not degrade
further.
VII. Conclusions
In conclusion, it may be worthwhile to mention sev-
eral salient points concerning the Mariner IV tempera-
ture control subsystem.
(1) The performance of the thermal shields was diffi-
cult to predict accurately and may be influenced
by the emittance of the outer surface or the design
details of the seams and attachments.
(2) A hardware design should provide the flexibility
to permit adjustments during the evolution of the
spacecraft design. This kind of design was pro-
vided by standardized louver assemblies which
could be relocated easily with a variety of small
polished metal case shields, permitting more flexi-
bility without a change in the thermal design.
(3) The Absorptivity Standard showed that the space
simulator tests had errors due to the intensity
measurements as well as spectral deviation from
sunlight. Comparison of the simulator test and
flight data of the black and aluminum silicone
samples revealed that the simulator intensity was
10% higher than the simulator instrumentation
reading. The «s of the ARF-2 and polished alumi-
num for the JPL solar simulator are approximately
37% and 9% greater, respectively, than for sun-
light.
(4) A workable thermal design must have a plan for
the maintenance of the optical properties of its
temperature-control surfaces. The use of easily
cleaned durable paints and bolt-on shield and
louver assemblies was an acceptable method of
achieving this objective.
(5) The flight results indicated that the thermal de-
sign succeeded and that all thermal control
hardware functioned as designed. Discrepancies
between predictions and flight data are attribut-
able to an imperfect understanding of test data
and spacecraft characteristics; not to hardware
degradations or malfunctions. Specifically, louvers,
thermal shields, and surface coatings used on
Mariner IV reliably fulfilled mission requirements.
(6) A recommendation based on Mariner IV results
is that a comprehensive checkout of space simu-
lator facilities be performed before committing to
a flight design based on test. Particular emphasis
should be placed on the evaluation of solar simu-
lator performance and on the detection of extra-
neous heat inputs from chamber walls.
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